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Reforming Institutions: Where to Begin? 
 
M. IDREES KHAWAJA and SAJAWAL KHAN1  
 
Institutions promote growth—this view now holds firm ground. The task then is to ‘engineer’ 
growth promoting institutions. Endogeneity characterises institutions, for example, groups enjoying 
political power influence economic institutions but political power itself is a function of wealth. The 
question then is: what to reform first? History stands witness that generally the societies with extreme 
inequality and a heterogeneous population tend to evolve institutions that restrict access to economic 
opportunities for the poor which in turn constrains economic development. On the other hand 
societies with greater equality and homogeneous population typically enjoy growth-promoting 
institutions.12 Institutional reforms should therefore begin with institutions that serve to create or 
perpetuate inequality and heterogeneity in the society. We argue that the four different kinds of 
educational systems in operation in Pakistan are a major source of creating and perpetuating 
inequality and heterogeneity in the population. Access to a single and common educational system  
will open-up similar opportunities of higher education and job attainment for all the citizens, thereby 
reducing inequality.  Diverse educational systems promote different sets of beliefs while a uniform 
system forges belief-convergence in the society that in turn facilitates agreement on a common set of 
institutional reforms. Therefore it is the educational system that should be the first to reform. We also 
argue that in Pakistan, unlike some European countries in the 17th century, neither commercial 
interest nor fiscal constraints can force the de jure power to reform institutions. Typically, large 
commercial interests in Pakistan have thrived on favours from the de jure power and therefore have 
no interest in changing the system. Foreign aid eases the fiscal constraints from time to time relieving 
government of the need to reform institutions. The thought of a revolution of some kind is still a far 
cry, the society having no such inclination. The alternative then is the gradual approach preferred by 
North, Acemoglu and Rodrik.23 This  gradual approach suggests  the area of educational reforms. 
 
JEL classification: D02, D03, P16 
Keywords: Institutional Evolution, Institutional Change, Human Behaviour 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of history in shaping economic outcomes is being increasingly 
examined.34 One view is that important events in the history of a nation shape its 
institutions that in turn determine its economic performance. A country endowed with 
poor institutions, performs poorly. The question is how a country can break loose of the 
historical factors to begin the process of institutional reform and thus place itself on the 
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track of economic progress. What we need to know is that whether it is possible to reform 
all institutions in one go—the big bang approach, or if the institutions can be reformed 
only gradually—one, or at best, few at a time. If one favours the gradualist approach, 
then the obvious question is what to reform first, that is, where to begin? 
Concisely speaking institutions represent ‘rules of the game’ or “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” [North (1990)]. They have also been defined as 
“actual organisational entities, procedural devices, and regulatory frameworks” [WEO 
(2003)].  The most widely cited definition in literature is again from North (1981)—“a set 
of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to 
constrain the behaviour of individuals in the interests of maximising the wealth or utility 
of principals”. He terms formal rules, informal constraints and the enforcement 
characteristics of the two as the complete set of institutions.  
The view that institutions represent the rules of the game holds firm    
ground.45 No society is devoid of institutions, however many have poor 
institutions.Then how does a society gets institutions that promote economic growth? 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) argue that institutions are endogenous—political 
institutions influence economic institutions and vice versa. For example, political 
institutions, whether democratic or autocratic, determine who enjoys political power. 
Who gets access to economic opportunities—masses or the élites, is determined by 
the political power and hence political institutions. However who makes it to the 
echelons of power, especially in developing countries, is in part determined by 
wealth, and therefore economic institutions. Given the endogeneity, an attempt to 
move from one set of institutions to another, for example, from autocracy to 
democracy, may be successfully thwarted by the would-be losers. For example 
monopolies (economic institutions) supported by the autocrat may thwart market 
oriented reforms, if the monopolist or the autocrat himself is deriving rents from their 
prevalence. The endogeneity problem tempts one to suggest that institutions can only 
be reformed with a big bang—reform all institutions in one go, perhaps through a 
revolution. However this leaves us with the problem of how to stage a revolution. 
Successful revolutions typically are preceded by a certain thought-process [Masood 
(1991)] which at times may spread over a century. For example, the European 
enlightenment thought, beginning as far back as 16th century, preceded the 
revolutions of UK (1688), US (1787) and France (1789). Even when it becomes 
possible to stage-manage a revolution, the post-revolution institutional changes may 
not be too revolutionary. North (1990) has quoted examples from history to show 
that post-revolution institutional changes exhibit the legacy of the past.  
If one were to practice gradualism, reforming institutions one by one, the question 
arises, what to reform first? What conditions should an institution satisfy to top the 
agenda of institutional reform? To prescribe such conditions the knowledge of the 
historical sources that had constrained the development of growth-promoting institutions 
is essential. Based on implicit evidence for India,56 with whom Pakistan shares a common 
 
4Enormous literature including, but not limited to, Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, et al. (2001, 
2002), Easterly and Levine (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik, et al. (2002) have shown that 
institutions matter in economic growth. For an exhaustive survey of literature on the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth, see Acemoglu, et al. (2005 a) and Hasan (2007).  
5See Benergee and Iyre (2005).  
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colonial heritage, we subscribe to the Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) view that initial 
inequality and population heterogeneity are the sources of path-dependence exhibited by 
the institutions. 
In this context, Gazdar (2004) explains how the land tenure arrangements put in 
place during the colonial rule over the areas that now form Pakistan served to create 
inequality. He convincingly argues that first the land tenure arrangements like Royatwari 
in Sindh and Mhalwari in Punjab67 sought to create a landholder-advantage and then the 
canal colonisation highly skewed the power configuration in favour of the landlords.  Ali 
(1988) also provides exhaustive evidence that canal colonies developed during the 
colonial rule over India in western Punjab, now the most populous province of Pakistan, 
served to create inequality and heterogeneity in population. Later on, the development 
policies pursued in the 1950s and 1960s not only served to perpetuate but further widen 
the income inequality that prevailed then. To understand how inequality and 
heterogeneity is casting an adverse influence on development, one has only to look at 
how influence has been very recently used to divert the natural flow of flood waters to 
save the agricultural land and residential estates the of landed elites.78 The endless 
controversy over construction of Kalabagh dam, presence of regional political parties 
with votes in specific communities and host of religious parties drawing inspiration from 
different factions of Islam, are sources of heterogeneity, to name a few. 
With this background in mind, we can lay down the criteria for the choice of the 
institution to be reformed, first and foremost. Our criteria are: (i) Inequality and 
heterogeneity in population being the source of path-dependence, the institution to be 
reformed first should serve to reduce inequality and heterogeneity in the population; (ii) 
the institution selected to be the first should be the one that would face relatively lesser 
resistance from other institutions or whose reform will not be constrained by the absence 
of some other institution; (iii) its impact should be all encompassing and long-lasting. 
Regarding condition (ii), we emphasise at the outset that the condition of ‘relatively 
lesser resistance’ by no means implies that we expect to find an institution that will meet 
little resistance from the stakeholders—the relative nature of the phrase should not be lost 
sight of. For example suppose that the level of discontent with the de jure power is such 
that to thwart an attempt by the citizens to secure a change in power structure, the 
existing de jure power, must do one of the two: curb rent-seeking or reform the 
educational system to adequately groom the populace. Which one would the rulers 
choose; naturally the latter. Why? The former would hurt them now while the latter 
would hurt them, at best, a generation-hence. Path dependence being an essential feature 
of institutions, these are difficult to change. Given the difficulty, the cost of change is 
high. Only an all-encompassing and long-lasting impact would justify the costs involved. 
Hence the condition (iii) prescribed above.  
The Paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we review the works of Douglas 
North, Darron Acemoglu and Dani Rodrik. Section 3 examines the comparative 
experiences of institutional change (or non-change) of 17th century Britain and 
Netherlands versus France and Spain, 19th century Britain and Germany versus Austria 
 
6Sindh and Punjab are the two provinces of Pakistan. 
7Only newspaper reports are available as reference on the subject. The events are too recent to have 
found mention in journal papers and other reports. 
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and Russia, 18th and 19th century North America versus South America,  and Korea and 
Taiwan versus Congo in the 20th century. Section 4 contains a ‘brief’ on enlightenment 
era, the objective being to show to what extent the institutional evolution, has benefited 
from the thoughts of enlightenment philosophers. Based on the lessons drawn from the 
theories discussed in Section 2, the historical experiences discussed in Section 3, and the 
thoughts of enlightenment philosophers reviewed in Section 4, the discussion in Section 5 
is devoted to the primary objective of the paper—where to begin the process of 
institutional reform? Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
1.  Douglas North89 
The key elements of  North’s theory of institutional change are: (i)    The process 
of development of human perceptions and beliefs; (ii) those  whose beliefs matter; (iii) 
intentionality and comprehension of the issue by those whose beliefs matter; and (iv) path 
dependence exhibited by the institutions. These are only the building blocks in the 
process of institutional change. The element, in North’s framework, that triggers the 
change in institutions is the change in bargaining strengths of the parties to the contract. 
 
2.1.  Process of Institutional Change 
To understand the process of institutional change let us begin from the state of 
institutional equilibrium. Institutions being rules of the game reflect a contract between 
two parties.  The institutional equilibrium prevails when parties to the contract do not 
want to alter the terms of the contract [North 1990)]. The state of institutional equilibrium 
does not essentially imply that the parties are satisfied with the terms of the contract, 
rather, it only reflects that given the costs and benefits involved in altering the terms of 
the contract, the parties do not consider it worthwhile to devote resources towards 
changing the terms. To illustrate this, assume that the majority of the populace of a 
country feels that the de jure power has persistently failed to enforce the terms of the 
contract, in letter and spirit, i.e., it has failed to implement the constitution. Given this 
failure, the public wants a change in the de jure power. Further, assume that the desired 
institutional change is possible only if the masses rise against those who currently wield 
the de jure power. This will require some sacrifices on the part of the masses and may 
entail retaliation as well from the de jure power. Sacrifices involve putting in one’s time, 
effort and money. The retaliation may take the form of arrests, loss of government job, 
and in extreme cases, getting injured or even losing one’s life in a violent protest. Given 
this scenario, the citizens will devote resources towards institutional change only if the 
perceived benefits from the change are greater than the costs involved [North (1990)]. 
For example, if the citizens subscribe to the view that a change in de jure power will not 
affect their lives or, at best, the effect would be cosmetic, then they will not strive for a 
change in de jure power—masses in Pakistan, who, despite being dissatisfied with the 
performance of the wielders of de jure power  have not actively worked for change, seem 
to subscribe to this view.   
 
8For exposition of North’s theory of institutional change, we draw heavily upon North (1990, 2005). 
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A noteworthy element of North’s framework is that it is only the perception of 
costs and benefits of bringing about an institutional change that matter— the agents’ 
decision does not depend on that,which can be observed, though only ex post. As such, 
the costs and benefits have to be assessed.. This implies that agents can be lured to 
undertake efforts towards institutional change by exaggerating the expected benefits and 
underplaying some of the expected costs. The exaggeration of costs on the other hand 
would discourage the agents to work for a change. 
So far we have determined that institutional change is a function of change in 
human perceptions that ultimately translate into beliefs. Therefore to manage an 
institutional change by design, it is the beliefs system that should be influenced in a 
manner which is conducive to achieve the desired institutional change. The crucial 
question here is if it is possible to influence the belief system of a people, and if yes, to 
what extent and how quickly. This brings us to the second key element of North’s theory 
of institutional change: the process of belief formation.  
 
2.1.1. Formation of Perceptions and Beliefs 
North argues that “institutions impose constraints on human behaviour”, therefore,  
a theory of institutional change will focus on human behaviour. North (2005) rightly 
delves deep into psychology to understand the process of belief formation. He concludes 
that human perceptions transform into beliefs, but perceptions themselves depend upon 
learning. North draws upon the work of a number of psychologists to understand the 
learning process. One view is that the learning process is guided by epigenetic rules—the 
development of an organism under the joint influence of heredity and experience. 
However the exact composition of genetic predisposition and experience remains a moot 
point. A similar view is that three sources, viz. genetics, cultural heritage and 
environment contribute to learning. The role of these sources in the process of learning is 
discussed below: 
 The genetic predisposition of an individual is composed of what North (2005) 
calls the artifactual structure (i.e. foundation)  which is transmitted from generation to 
generation. North views the informal norms to be the  most important carrier of this 
artifactual structure, though the structure comprises formal rules as well. He suggests that 
as changes occur in the human environment, these are gradually assimilated into the 
socio-cultural-linguistic inheritance and are embodied in the foundation. 
According to Hayek (1960), cultural evolution, the second source in North’s 
process of learning, consists of intergenerational transfer of knowledge, values, and 
attitudes etc., that have accumulated through the Darwinian process of evolution. Thus a 
society’s culture incorporates the distilled experience of the past,  more than what a 
single person can accumulate in his life time. Given the contribution of past knowledge, 
values and attitudes to the prevailing culture, a cultural change would be very difficult to 
bring about. Culture can be manipulated by design only to the extent of what the present 
day knowledge and experience can contribute to it. A certain fractional change in culture 
will occur in a generation’s time depending upon the kind and quantity of knowledge that 
the society chooses to gain and the experiences that it has to pass through today, or by the 
act of others or by the will of nature. The process of cultural change is therefore, without 
doubt, highly incremental. 
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As to the contribution of human environment, the third source of learning, North 
again prescribes a slow evolutionary process. He says that “if the mind has been 
programmed by millions of years of hunter/gatherer tradition then the flexibility to adjust 
to a very different modern world may be very limited, as implied by evolutionary 
psychologist. The reason why change in environment is a slow evolutionary process is 
that millions of years of hunter/gatherer tradition cannot be altered by one-off 
experience—a steady stream of experiences is required to affect the change”.  However 
given John Locke’s view on empiricism (http://www.wsu.edu:8001/~dee/ENLIGHT/), 
the environment can be influenced through education or, to speak more broadly, by 
creating the desired kind of awareness, even if Locke’s stipulation about human mind 
being tabula rasa (i.e. erased board) at birth does not hold true. 
Thus, institutional change being a function of change in beliefs, in order to design 
a conscious institutional change, we shall have to influence what a person learns. 
Therefore education is at the heart of the matter. No wonder that the countries that boast 
of good institutions today have been placing emphasis on education for long. For 
example,  in the  United States over 40 percent of the school-age population had been  
enrolled in schools and nearly 90 percent of the white adult males were literate by around 
1850. Similarly schooling was also widespread in Canada by early nineteenth century 
[Engerman and Sokoloff (2005)]. The influence of education on institutional change is 
discussed  more comprehensively later on.  
 
2.1.2.  Dominant Beliefs 
North (2005) emphasises time and again that institutions depend upon beliefs or 
the subjective mental constructs that the agents possess. He asks upon whose beliefs the 
choice of institutions is incumbent, and answer himself, that it is the dominant beliefs, the 
beliefs of those who are in a position to enact institutional change, that matter. North’s 
view that it is the ‘dominant beliefs’ that matter, implicitly builds upon his own earlier 
view [North (1990)] that the change in relative prices alters the bargaining strength of the 
parties to the contract. The party enjoying greater bargaining power attempts to alter the 
contract. This is to say that the beliefs of the dominant players matter.  
 
2.1.3. Intentionality and Comprehension of the Dominant Players  
North (2005) argues that it is not just the dominant beliefs that matter but the 
intentionality, and comprehension of the issue, of the dominant players, i.e., the  mental 
construct of the players also matters. He goes on to suggest that the world economic 
growth has remained sporadic throughout history because either the players’ move was 
never intended to maximise social welfare or the flawed comprehension of the issue has 
caused the results to deviate from intentions (North, 2005).The rise and fall of the 
socialist Soviet Union is a case in point where perhaps the intention were correct but the 
dominant players failed to comprehend the issue in its totality. The case of intentionality 
can be seen in Pakistan’s domestic environment. Laws have been enacted in the recent 
past to grant independence to SBP. However the tenure of its governor has been fixed at 
three years that is renewable for another term of three years. The point to note here is that 
the tenure of the government is five years. How can a governor who must seek renewal of 
tenure for another term from an incumbent government show independence in policy 
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making? Another case in point is the ongoing debate over whether or not the Chief 
Justice of Supreme Court, deposed by former military dictator, be restored.910  
 
2.1.4. Path Dependence 
The most important element in North’s theory of institutional change is path 
dependent which is the resemblance of today’s institutions to yesterday’s. To reiterate, 
it’s the beliefs system that decides the kind of institutions that a society will choose. 
Given the painfully slow learning process, described above, that influences the belief 
system, it is only natural to expect that institutions will exhibit, what the literature on 
institutional economics terms path dependence—resemblance to the institutions of the 
yesteryears. There are three important sources of path dependence; (i) increasing returns 
to scale; (ii) informal rules; and (iii) the organisation’s that owe their existence to existing 
institutional arrangement.  
North (1990) argues that institutions exhibit increasing returns to scale which  
makes the change in institutions difficult. He explains that three sources make the returns 
to institutions increasing in nature: (i) Initial set up costs, (ii) coordination effects, and 
(iii) reduction in uncertainty. North explains that when institutions are created de novo, 
organisations incur costs to learn and adapt their behaviour to the existing institutional 
framework. Overtime, the organisations learn and evolve to take advantage of the 
opportunity set offered by the existing institutional framework. This learning and 
adaptation, cuts down the unit cost of operating within the current institutional 
framework. Secondly, there are positive coordination effects, directly through contracts 
with other organisations, and indirectly through investment in complimentary activities 
by the State. Finally, contracting more and more under specific institutional framework 
reduces the uncertainty about the permanence of the rule. This makes the parties to the 
contract more comfortable with the existing institutional matrix. These three elements 
jointly make the returns to institutions increasing in nature. The increasing returns to 
institutions in turn create organisations and interest groups that enjoy a stake in 
maintaining the existing institutional matrix because the change would affect them 
adversely.  
Besides the increasing returns, another source of path dependence is the informal 
norms, an important component of the institutional matrix. While the formal rules can be 
changed with a stroke of the pen, informal rules are more difficult to change. Pejovich 
(2006) eloquently lays down the formation process of informal rules. He argues that as 
human beings interact to survive, some interactions are repeated over and over again, not 
the least because the public understands their utility but simply because these have 
worked. Eventually the interactions that pass the test of time are institutionalised into 
taboos, traditions, moral values, beliefs etc. To explain the process of change in informal 
institutions, Pejovich argues that when a person or a community develops a new idea, this 
enlarges the opportunity set of human interaction. If the new exchange opportunities call 
for a behaviour which is not in conformity with the established ethos, the community 
would consider the behaviour of those exploiting the opportunities as sub marginal. and 
therefore, the community may react with sanctions like ostracism etc. However, if the 
 
9The Chief Justice was deposed for not yielding to the wishes of the former dictator and his restoration 
is now being popularly considered as a symbol of allowing the judiciary to function independently. 
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returns are high enough to sustain a large number of repeated interaction (between more 
and more groups) relative to costs (including sanctions) the success of new activities 
would force adjustment in the set of informal institutions. Such adjustment may include 
the addition of new norms to the set of informal institutions, change in an old norm or 
simply ignoring an otherwise established norm. It is the painfully slow process of change 
in informal rules that makes the overall institutions path dependent. The process of 
formation of informal rules laid down by Pejovich confirms the path dependence argued 
by North and gradualism in institutional evolution favoured by Rodrick (2006). 
Finally, institutions may exhibit path dependence because some of the 
organisations born out of existing institutional matrix (the combination of formal rules, 
informal constraints and enforcement characteristics of the two) may owe their very 
existence to that specific institutional arrangement; and a drastic change in such an 
institutional arrangement may sound a sudden-death for the organisation. Therefore 
existing organisations will attempt to block institutional change.  
To sum up, the increasing returns to institutions, preferences of the organisation 
born out of current institutional matrix and the informal rules together conspire to make 
the change in institutions highly incremental and the institutions path-dependant. North 
cites various examples to support his views on path dependence e.g., the US constitution, 
Common Law and the North West Ordinance in the US. In Pakistan we refer to a number 
of institutions e.g., Land titling [Kardar (2007)] and Civil Service [Haque and Khawaja 
(2007)] as legacy of our colonial past. 
 
2.1.5.  Lessons from Douglas North 
The key lesson from North is that path dependence makes it difficult for 
institutions to change and that any long lasting change must be incremental. North’s 
emphasis upon institutions being a function of belief system provides room for designing 
an institutional change by influencing the belief system. His view that beliefs and the 
dominant players’ability to comprehend an issue matter, calls for influencing their beliefs 
and improving their comprehension. However, since it is difficult to predict who would 
be the dominant players a generation hence, a long-lasting institutional change would call 
for influencing the beliefs and improving the abilities of all and sundry to correctly 
comprehend an issue at hand. More importantly, influencing the beliefs of all, rather than 
a few, is required to secure homogeneity in the population. This homogeneity would in 
turn facilitate agreement on a common set of institutional reforms [Egerman and Sokoloff 
(2005)]. How is homogeneity in beliefs to be secured, is the subject matter of Section 5.  
 
2.2. Darron Acemoglu 
Different set of institutions may induce a different kind of resource allocation; 
some institutions would allow competitive forces to play their role while others would 
promote rent seeking. So for individuals to prefer one set of institutions over another is 
but natural. Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) argues that given the preference of different 
individuals over different set of institutions, the group with the greater political power is 
likely to secure the institutions of its choice. (This is similar to North’s viewpoint that 
belief of the dominant players matter or that the bargaining strengths of the players 
matter). 
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Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) argues that an ideal course for the groups with 
conflicting interests would be to agree over the set of institutions that maximise aggregate 
growth and then use their political power to determine the distribution of gains. In 
practice, groups with conflicting interests do not follow this course. The reason is that 
there are commitment problems inherent in the use of political power i.e.,  a monarch or a 
dictator cannot credibly commit against use of power to his advantage. A monarch or a 
dictator enjoying absolute power  may promise today to respect property rights but in 
future nothing would restrain him to renege on his promise. Citing the case of UK, 
Acemoglu, et  al. (2005a) states “ institutional changes in England as a result of Glorious 
revolution, of 1688 were not simply conceded by the Stuart kings. James II had to be 
deposed for the changes to take place”. 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) suggests that the distribution of political power in society 
is endogenous. It is the political institutions, for example, monarchy or democracy, that 
determine who holds the de jure power. However, some individuals or groups, though not 
allocated power by political institutions, may still enjoy de facto power because of their 
ability to revolt, hold strikes (by trade bodies), hold protests (peaceful or violent), use 
military power, clergy power or mercenaries etc., to impose their will upon the society. 
The de facto power of a group largely depends upon the economic resources that it 
enjoys, which determines its ability to use force and influence the de jure power. It is 
often the de facto power that forces a change in de jure power. Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) 
asks why the de facto power does not settle for getting institutions of its choice from the  
de jure power but insists on changing the de jure power itself. Drawing upon the works 
of Lichbach (1995), Tarrow (1991) and Ross and Gurr (1989), the authors answer that de 
facto power is often transitory in nature. Not being sure that its power will continue 
unabated, it wants to transform the de jure power in a manner that it will continue to 
work in conformity with the beliefs of the  de facto power even after it has ceased to 
exist. 
 
2.2.1. Lesson from Acemoglu 
The lesson then from Acemoglu is that change depends upon the relative 
bargaining strengths of the de jure and de facto powers. Suppose that the bargaining 
strength of de jure power is greater and the existing institutions are poorer, then in this 
case the institutions will remain poor. However if the bargaining strength of the  de facto 
power is greater and the existing institutions are poorer, the de facto power then will 
force the de jure power to provide institutions of their choice. The de jure power will 
either yield in favour of institutional change or will be replaced, no matter what modus 
operandi is adopted by the people who share the beliefs of the de facto power. The 
bottom line then is that institutional change will have to wait for the emergence of de 
facto power that can force the de jure power to yield. The question then is, can the 
emergence of the requisite de facto power be designed. We take up this question in 
Section 5.    
 
2.3. Dani Rodrick 
Rodrick illustrates the process of institutional development by equating institutions 
with technology that transforms primary endowments of a society into a larger bundle of 
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outputs. He explains that the requisite technology could be either general purpose or highly 
specific to local needs. He further argues that if the technology (institution) is general 
purpose in nature and is easily available on the world market, then it can be adopted by 
simply importing a blueprint from the developed countries (or any country whose 
institutions are considered good). However, if the technology is specific to local conditions, 
which is more often the case, then technology would evolve by trial and error. This suggests 
that a society is able to build institutions, only gradually. Rodrick argues that one reason 
why gradualism prevails over the blue print approach is that much of the technology is tacit 
and therefore not available in black and white. This makes the blue print highly incomplete 
and of little use to the importers. However, Rodrick feels that imported blue prints can 
prove useful for some narrowly defined technical issues, but large scale institutional 
development, by and large, calls for discovering local needs and developing rules that serve 
such needs. 
 
2.3.1. Lesson from Dani Rodrick 
Rodrik’s emphasis upon gradualism is akin to North’s path dependence. Secondly, 
Rodrik’s view, that imported blue prints have limited usefulness and that for large scale 
institutional change to happen, local needs must first be discovered, tells us that foreign 
consultants charged with suggesting reform of local institutions may not be ideally suited 
to do the task. 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES1011 
 
3.1.  17th Century Britain and Netherlands versus Spain and France 
The institutions in Britain and Netherlands on the one hand, and Spain and France 
on the other hand took divergent paths in late 17th century—while Britain and 
Netherlands moved towards institutions that promoted commercial activity, Spain and 
France moved towards extractive institutions. Acemoglu, et al. (2005a) argues that 
whether or not the institutional change occurred depended upon how powerful the groups 
demanding institutional change were?  
The rise of the constitutional monarchy in Europe is instructive. The following 
scene prevailed in the early sixteenth century UK. From 1603 onwards, England was 
ruled by Stuarts who continuously had revenue problems.  To generate revenue the 
Crown sold lands, extended monopoly rights, seized private property and defaulted on 
loan repayments. The Parliament, though in existence, enjoyed little say in affairs of the 
country and the Crown could dissolve the assembly even upon minor differences with the 
Parliament. Supreme judicial power rested with the Star Chamber, which held legislative 
powers too, and primarily represented the Crown’s interests. This was Britain prior to the 
Civil War of 1646. The Civil War and then the Glorious Revolution of 1688 led to 
sweeping changes in institutions; the Star Chamber was abolished, restrictions were 
placed on monopolies, cases involving property were to be tried under Common Law and 
the Parliament was to have regular standings. The Parliament gained a central role in 
financial matters with exclusive powers to raise taxes. This also gave more security to 
 
10For this section we draw upon Acemoglu, Lecture notes. 
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property rights of all and sundry, especially to the rights of those with financial and 
commercial interest. In sum, UK was transformed into a parliamentary monarchy with 
powers of the Crown significantly trimmed. The question that begs the answer is, how 
could the commercial interest become so strong in Britain. Acemoglu, et  al. (2005a) 
argues that the Lords had gained a stronger position during the 14th and 15th century and 
were able to force the creation of the Parliament, to put limits to the authority of the 
Crown (but certainly not to protect the commercial interests). The Lords forced the 
Crown to ‘live on his own’ with strict restrictions on expanding his revenues. Perhaps 
these restrictions later on enabled the commercial interests to become stronger and 
demand more rights.  
The 16th century Netherlands was the most important commercial area of Europe. 
The powerful groups in the country were for encouragement to commercial activity and 
enforcement of property rights. Netherlands, being under Spanish control then, provided 
substantial revenue to the Spanish Crown. Economic development in Netherlands 
threatened the interest of Spain. The towns in Netherlands, under the leadership of 
William of  Orange, rebelled against Spain, leading to Dutch independence in the 16th 
century. What is important is the fact that the merchants of Netherlands wholeheartedly 
financed the rebellion. 
An explanation put forth by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005b) for the 
transformation of Britain and Netherlands is that in the 16th century the opportunities 
generated by ‘Atlantic trade’ had increased the wealth and therefore the political power 
of the commercial interests. This enabled them to demand and obtain more rights.  
This brings us to the question as to why, out of the countries involved in ‘Atlantic 
trade’ only the commercial interests in Britain and Netherlands were able to enrich 
themselves from the opportunities generated by the trade, while the commercial interests 
in France and Spain could not exploit such opportunities. Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) 
provides the answer. The authors explain that in England and Netherlands the trade was 
mostly carried out by individuals and partnerships, while in France and Spain, trade was 
primarily under the control of the Crown. The differences in organisation of trade in turn 
reflected the different political institutions of these countries. Grant of trade monopolies 
used to be an important source of fiscal revenues for the Crown; the more powerful 
monarchs could increase their revenues by granting trade monopolies or by directly 
controlling trade while for weaker monarchs this was a luxury they could not afford. At 
the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Crown was much stronger in France and Spain, 
than in Britain and Netherlands, and this was the most important factor in the difference 
in organisation of trade in these countries. Consequently, in England and Netherlands, 
and not in France and Spain, a new class of merchants arose with interests directly 
opposed to the interests of the Crown. The new class of merchants later on played an 
important role, as described earlier, in subsequent political changes. 
 
3.1.2.  Lessons from the Institutional Evolution in Britain and Netherlands versus   
          Institutional Evolution in Spain and France 
Two lessons are apparent from the historical comparison of Britain and 
Netherlands with France and Spain. One, strong commercial interests hold the potential 
to emerge as de facto power that may successfully challenge the de jure power if the 
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latter fails to provide the institutions that commercial interests require. We learn from the 
European history that more often than not, the de facto power that emerged in the form of 
commercial interest had to force a change in the de jure power to acquire the institutions 
of its choice.  
The second lesson is that the fiscal constraints may force the authorities to strike a 
bargain with the citizens with the effect that the public provides for the fiscal needs of the 
government which in turn provides good institutions, the institutions that the public 
prefers. This incidentally is the thesis of Moore (2002) who argues that nations that enjoy 
recourse to unearned income (i.e. income from natural resources and foreign aid) 
typically have to put up with poor institutions while the countries that rely mostly on 
earned income (from taxation) have relatively good institutions. To account for the 
difference, Moore argues that to induce the citizens to pay taxes the authorities have to 
provide them with good institutions and the citizens view taxes as the cost of such 
institutions. However, since the rulers of the nations with unearned income do not have to 
lean on citizens for revenues, therefore, they are not constrained to provide good 
institutions. 
 
3.2.  19th Century Britain and Germany vs. Austria-Hungary and Russia 
During the 19th century, Britain and Germany went through rapid industrialisation 
in contrast to the industrialisation process in Austria-Hungary and Russia. To account for 
the difference, Acemoglu (Lecture Notes, p. 200) argues that the elites in Britain had 
relatively more to gain from industrialisation than those in Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
Besides, while the landed aristocracy in Britain enjoyed relatively secure position and 
was less threatened by the process of industrialisation, the aristocracy in Austria-Hungary 
and Russia stood to lose more rents if they lost political power. 
The lesson from the above is all too familiar—the rent-seekers will thwart 
institutional change with success depending upon the bargaining strength that they enjoy. 
 
3.3.  North vs. South America in the 18th and 19th Century 
In the 18th century, some Caribbean and Latin American countries were richer 
than North America. However, while North America industrialised rapidly in the 19th 
century, the Caribbean Islands and much of South America stagnated during the period. 
Acemoglu (lecture notes) argues that the powerful groups in North America generally 
favoured policies that encouraged commercial interests and industrialisation, while in the 
Caribbean and South America the groups in power opposed industrialisation. 
To account for the difference in institutional and economic development of North 
and South America, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) argue that it is the initial conditions 
or endowments of a country that play a fundamental role in determining the long run 
paths of development of a country. The basic import of their thesis is that the colonies in 
the Americas that began with extreme inequality and population heterogeneity, developed 
institutions that restricted access to economic opportunities and contributed to lower rates 
of public investment in schools and infrastructure, thus beginning a vicious circle of 
underdevelopment. The authors argue that the climate and the soil of the colonies like 
Brazil and the Caribbean were suitable for growing cash crops like sugarcane. These 
crops enjoyed large scale economies and were most efficiently grown using slave labour. 
Reforming Institutions: Where to Begin? 
 
253
The colonial masters in these countries imported slave labour from the international 
market for slaves and thus the population of these countries came to be dominated by 
slave labour. This led to highly unequal distribution of wealth, human capital and 
political power. South America was attractive for European colonisers because of the 
potential huge return that use of slave labour afforded. On the other hand, the areas that 
now constitute North America and Canada, were not very attractive to the Europeans 
when they began to colonise the New World (Americas). This was because the climate 
and soil of the areas was suitable only for the production of grains and livestock that 
involved small scale economies and used few slaves. When the opportunities in the South 
were close to exhaustion, the Europeans began to colonise North America and Canada. 
Since the land was abundant and labour scanty, the colonisers offered various incentives 
to encourage the migration of European citizens to the United States and Canada. 
Engerman and Sokoloff identify three historical institutions that were designed to attract 
European settlers to the areas. These included adult male franchise, schooling and 
ownership of land. Accordingly much greater percentage of the rural population in 
United States and Canada owned the land that they cultivated and landholdings were 
typically smaller. Similarly a far greater percentage of the population enjoyed access to 
schooling in the United States and Canada than in Latin America. Thus, argue the 
authors, the institutions that promote growth were necessitated by the homogeneous 
character of the population in the United States and Canada.  
To further argue for belief-homogeneity as a facilitator of institutional change, we 
refer to Collier (2007). The author stresses that even autocracies are less stable in 
ethnically diverse societies. The reason is that, in ethnically diverse societies only one of 
the many groups will be aligned to the autocrat. Given the narrow support base of the 
autocrat, his support group can engage in rent-seeking or this may induce the autocrat to 
dole out favours to the opposition. All this constrains institutional change. 
The comparison reveals that initial endowments of a country or region influence 
institutional evolution. The societies that begin with extreme inequality and population 
heterogeneity tend to have institutions that restrict access to economic opportunities, 
while the societies with relative equality and population homogeneity are more likely to 
facilitate the evolution of growth enhancing institutions.  
The comparison of North and South America also highlights the primacy of 
economic interests and also, as to who enjoys power—those with interest in rent-
seeking or those with interest in secure property rights. If the de jure power is with 
the aristocracy, it will not establish good institutions on its own. The good 
institutions must be forced from the de jure power by some group deriving de facto 
power from one or the other source. The analysis of the consequences of colonisation 
of North America and South America also confirms Olson’s (2000) ‘Roving and 
Stationary Bandits’ thesis: when a bandit (the ruler) is out there for a short time, he 
attempts to extract all that he can (and therefore establishes institutions with the 
extraction objective in mind); whereas if the bandit is in there to settle down, he 
extracts only part of the income of his subjects—the intact earning capacity of the 
subjects allows the stationary bandit a steady stream of extraction, now as well as in 
the future.  
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3.4. Korea and Taiwan vs. Congo (Zaire) 
In South Korea and Taiwan the leaders pursued developmental policies while  
General Mobutu made Congo the most kleptocratic regime. Acemoglu explains the 
reasons for the difference in choice of the rulers. He  believes that the explanation lies in 
‘constraints’—while Mobutu faced little constraints either from its neighbours or from 
the existing institutions, South Korea and Taiwan faced severe threats of communism via 
a revolution or invasion. 
It was the threat of communist revolution from outside as well as inside that forced 
General Park Chung Hee in South Korea and Kuomintang regime, led by Chiang Kai-
shek, in Taiwan to pursue developmental policies. Acemoglu believes that the primary 
motivation for investment in education and the institution of land reforms in Korea was 
the containment of unrest. The Kuomintang regime, the rulers of China before the 
revolution, despite having a history of being corrupt, predatory and rent seekers, were 
also forced to pursue the industrialisation path to avert the threat of communism in their 
new shelter—Taiwan.   
The situation in Congo was very different from Taiwan. In Congo, General 
Mobutu, the then Army chief, took over power shortly after independence. Mobutu 
dismantled the judiciary, removed the already weak institutional constraint, bought 
political support using state resources and proceeded to accumulate wealth. There were 
effectively no property rights and the GDP of Congo declined at the rate of 2 percent a 
year. How could Mobutu get away with this? To ward off any threat to his rule, Mobutu 
bought off political support using money provided by US, IMF and World Bank as 
developmental aid which, in fact, were payments to Mobutu to keep Congo non-
communist.  
The lesson from the experience of Korea and Taiwan is that the threat of a 
revolution may force the authorities to reform. Especially, the threat of an ideological 
change may induce the authorities to practise the ideology in vogue with more vigour 
thereby reforming the institutions as a consequence. While the lesson from the experience 
of Congo is that if the stronger world powers have common interest with the rent seekers, 
it would constrain institutional development. Put differently, this may also imply that if 
the world powers have some strategic interests in a country, then it might be easier for 
them to deal with a single person rather than a democratic regime. That single person, 
drawing legitimacy from foreign powers rather than the citizens of the country, will not 
be too bothered to facilitate growth-enhancing institutional change. 
 
4.  ENLIGHTENMENT ERA 
The 17th century is generally referred to as the European enlightenment era. In 
the context of institution-building the single most important contribution of the 
enlightenment thought is its successful attack on absolute monarchy. The thoughts of 
the enlightenment philosophers seem to have influenced institutional change in a 
number of countries, especially the framing of the constitution in the US seems to 
have benefited from the teachings of enlightenment philosophers like Hobbes, 
Montesquieu and Locke. A brief on the thoughts of the enlightenment philosophers is 
presented in Box 1.  
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5. FROM WHERE TO BEGIN? 
The discussion in the foregoing sections was meant to draw lessons for our 
main task, from where to begin the process of institutional reform? Before we present 
our own arguments for Pakistan, it will prove useful to briefly recap the lessons that 
we have learnt from historical experiences, of different countries, discussed in 
Section 3. 
Box 1 
The Enlightenment Era1 
Hobbes (1588-1679) was probably the first to argue that monarchs ruled not 
by the consent of Heaven, but by the consent of the people. Hobbes held that all 
human beings, being selfish will fight for resources. Therefore to protect 
individuals from each other, humanity at some early point agreed to a ‘social 
contract’ that specified the rules, individuals would live by. Hobbes reasoned that 
as human beings cannot live by their agreements, therefore authority was created to 
enforce the terms of the ‘social contract’. By authority Hobbes meant ‘monarchy’. 
For Hobbes, ‘humanity is better off living under the circumscribed freedoms of a 
monarchy rather than the violent anarchy of a completely equal and free life’. 
However, later on, in a twist of fate, his methods of inquiry as well as his basic 
assumptions became the basis, for arguments against absolute monarchy. Marquis 
de Montesquieu (1688-1755), a judicial official as well as a titled nobleman, was 
amongst the earliest critics of absolute monarchy. Montesquieu’s classic, The Spirit 
of Laws (1748) recognises geographic influences on political systems, advocates 
checks and balances in government and defends liberty against tyranny in an 
uncompromising manner. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) held the view that human 
beings’ inability to preserve themselves forced them to form societies. In doing so, 
the individuals surrendered their ‘individual right’ to ‘common right’—a notion 
very similar to Hobbes' ‘social contract’. Spinoza held that an inverse relationship 
existed between the power of an individual and the power of the State. Given this 
view Spinoza argues for democracy to create a balance of power between the state 
and the ‘individual’. John Locke (1632-1704) views human mind as completely 
empirical, rather, he argues that the only knowledge is empirical knowledge. He 
also held that human mind at birth is a tabula rasa (erased board). His empiricism 
coupled with the notion of tabula rasa meant that moral as well intellectual 
outcomes in human development can be altered to societal advantage by changing 
the environment through education. Locke proposed an extension of education to 
every member of society. His view of education dominates the western culture 
even to this day. Voltaire (1694-1778) popularised Newtonian science, fought for 
freedom of the press, and actively crusaded against the Church. In his endeavours 
he turned out hundreds of plays, pamphlets, essays and novels. He wrote around 
10,000 letters to different people in advocacy of his convictions. Even in his own 
time, he enjoyed the reputation of a legend, among kings as well as literate 
commoners.  
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Countries that experienced 
institutional change versus countries 
that (with similar circumstances) that 
did not experience institutional change 
Lessons from Historical Experiences 
 17th century Britain and Netherlands  
versus  Spain and France 
 
Fiscal constraints and then commercial 
interests forced the crown in UK to yield 
good institutions. Similarly in Netherlands 
commercial interests emerged as the de facto 
power that forced the change upon the rulers. 
19th century Britain and Germany  
versus Austria-Hungary and Russia 
 
Rent-seekers will thwart institutional 
change, with success depending upon the 
bargaining strength that they enjoy. 
18th and 19th century North America 
versus South America  
 
1. Institutions are a function of initial 
endowments of a nation. Extreme 
initial inequality and population 
heterogeneity leads to development of 
institutions that restrict opportunities 
for the poor and thus constrain growth.  
2. Economic interests enjoy primacy, if 
the de jure power is with the élites; it 
will not reform on its own. Some de 
facto power must emerge to force 
change onto de jure power 
Korea and Taiwan versus Congo (Zaire) 1. Lesson from the experience of Korea 
and Taiwan: the threat of a revolution 
may force the authorities to reform.  
2. Lesson from the experience of Congo: 
If the world powers have some 
strategic interests in a country then it 
would be easier for them to buy-
off/install some rent-seeking rulers in 
the country concerned rather than a 
democratic set up. This may constrain 
institutional development in the 
country concerned.  
 
5. 1.  Can Commercial Interests in Pakistan Force the Dejure Power to Change  
         Institutions for the Better? 
If the institutions are poor and the de jure power is not willing to reform 
institutions on its own or has been held hostage by some de facto power that stands to 
gain from maintaining the status quo, then some other de facto power must emerge that 
can force change upon the incumbent de jure power. This is what we learned from 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005a). The experience of institutional change in 17th century UK and 
the Netherlands as well as the significant difference between the institutional evolution of 
North and South America in the 18th and 19th century corroborates  this stance.  
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 How will the de facto power that may force the de jure power to enact 
institutional change emerge? This is the issue. Can the commercial interests, in Pakistan, 
emerge as the said de facto power? (As has happened in the 17th century UK). This is 
unlikely because a rent-seeking culture has characterised the economy through much of 
its history. For example, in the 1950s, the trade policy relying on high tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions conferred windfall gains on a small group of import licensees 
[Hussain (1999)], while in the 1960s, the import substituting industrialisation and the 
export bonus scheme allowed the exporters to amass wealth at the expense of other 
segments of the society.1112In the  1980s and 1990s, the  bureaucratic and the  political 
élite, and those who could afford to buy-off bank officials, benefited from bank loans that 
in essence were mostly not repaid. Given that large commercial interests in Pakistan, 
have prospered by way of rent seeking (and are used to securing favours from the de jure 
power), it is difficult for such interests to stand up against the de jure power to reform 
institutions. After all one does not bite one’s own hand.   
 
5.2.  Can Fiscal Constraints Force the de jure Power to Strike a Bargain with the 
Citizens for Taxation in Exchange for Good Institutions? 
Pakistan has faced fiscal constraints in the past and the situation is no different 
today. Will the fiscal constraints force the de jure power, as these had forced the de jure 
powers of UK and Netherlands, in the 17th century, to strike an implicit bargain with the 
citizens—taxation revenues in exchange for good institutions? Again this is unlikely. The 
times when the fiscal constraints could force the de jure power to strike a bargain with 
the citizens was when access to funds was neither available through borrowing from the 
country’s central bank (money creation) nor through foreign aid. Now the instrument of 
money creation has enabled the governments to delay the day of reckoning till the people 
burdened with inflation decide to revolt against the government (which does not happen 
too often). Second, Pakistan because of its geo-strategic position, had enjoyed access to 
sufficient foreign aid for the better part of its history. Given the present geo-political 
environment, the trend is likely to continue—foreign aid will alleviate the fiscal 
constraint and the de jure power will not be too pushed for taxation revenues. The 
implicit bargain i.e., taxation revenue in exchange for good institutions will not 
materialise.  
 
5.3. Strategic Interests of Foreign Powers:  
       A Constraint to Institutional Development  
Will the Congo-like situation prevail in Pakistan, that is, will the strategic interests 
of foreign powers constrain institutional development in Pakistan? In fact, a Congo- like 
situation has prevailed in Pakistan for the better part of its history. It goes without saying 
that foreign powers, especially the United States, do have strategic interests in Pakistan 
and the population of Pakistan in general does not feel pressed to pursue the strategic 
interests of foreign powers. Therefore it is in the interest of the foreign powers to buy off 
and even install an autocrat or at best a sham democracy, and ensure continuity of such 
rule. During its history of  61 years, Pakistan has witnessed four military regimes. Three 
 
11For an exhaustive account of rent-seeking reading through the host of books written on Pakistan 
economy is essential. These include Zaidi (2005), Amjad (1982), Hussain (1999). 
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of the four military rulers ruled for almost a decade each, with implicit or explicit support 
of the United States. US’ support to the military regimes in Pakistan, despite its avowed 
criticism of dictatorship, bears testimony to the ‘buy-off and rule’ strategy. The regimes 
that derive legitimacy from foreign powers rather than from the natives is not pushed to 
pursue institutional reforms, especially when it means shooting one’s own self in the  
foot, e.g., judicial independence.       
 
5.4. Will a Revolution Bring about Institutional Change in Pakistan? 
Revolutions are not spontaneous. All revolutions have their thinkers whose 
thoughts ignite the revolutions [Masood (1991)]. The monarchy in Europe did not 
collapse overnight. Around the time of the Glorious Revolution (1688) in UK and much 
before the French revolution, the enlightenment philosophers, like Montesquie, Spinoza 
and Voltaire had launched a strong attack against monarchy with their pen and voice. The 
thoughts of people like Allama Shariati and Ayatollah Mutahiri had provided the fodder 
for the Iranian revolution of 1979 [Masood (1991)]. To stage a revolution that ends up in 
long-lasting institutional change rather than chaos, not only the society should have 
developed sufficient apathy with the present rule but it should also have at least some 
idea of how to proceed after the revolution. Above all, if the human capital required for 
carrying out the institutional change is not available, even a revolution may fizzle-out or   
turn into chaos. To conclude, to stage a successful revolution the belief system of the 
society must be sufficiently influenced so that the society can perceive what wrong is 
being afflicted upon it and how it can remedy the situation. The question is, how can the 
beliefs be influenced?  
We have shown that fiscal constraints and commercial interests may not prove 
very effective in securing an institutional change in Pakistan. Besides, given the strategic 
interest of foreign powers in Pakistan, the possibility of foreign powers thwarting an 
institutional change cannot be ruled out, if the change is likely to compromise their 
interests. We have also discussed that given the obtaining intellectual thought process and 
the state of the human capital, the society in Pakistan may not be ready as yet  to stage a 
revolution that ends up in a meaningful institutional change. How to go about 
institutional change then? The option that remains is the gradualist approach, strongly 
advocated by Douglas North and implicitly evident in the works of  Darron Acemoglu 
and Dani Rodrik, to name a few.     
 
5.5. The Gradual Approach 
One of the key elements of North’s theory of institutional change is path 
dependence exhibited by institutions. This implies that a quick-fix solution to poor 
institutions is not possible. We want to re-emphasise here that revolutions that appear to 
have reformed institutions with a big-bang, were rooted in the thought process that in 
some cases had begun almost a century before the revolution actually materialised, for 
example the influence of 17th century enlightenment thought upon the French revolution 
and the framing of the US constitution. Other key elements of North’s theory that (i) 
institutions are influenced by beliefs, (ii) that dominant beliefs matter, (iii) the role of  
intentionality, and (iv) comprehension of the dominant players, provide hope that 
institutional change can be designed, but only with the process of change extending over 
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sufficient length of time. We consider below, whether North’s theory of institutional 
change can be put to practice by way of reform of the educational system in Pakistan. 
Institutions that get established, according to North, are a function of beliefs of the 
society. To design an institutional change, the task then is to influence the societal 
beliefs. The belief formation, we have learned is a function of genetics, culture and 
human environment. To recap, beliefs can be influenced only to the extent that today’s 
learning and experiences influence the culture and human environment. Thus the beliefs 
that are conducive to desired institutional change can be developed, by providing to the 
citizens, the education and human environment which is conducive to the preferred 
institutional change. 
But it is not just the individual beliefs that matter; rather it is the beliefs of the 
society that count. This means that in a more homogeneous society the task of securing 
an institutional change would be relatively less difficult. Here we need to recall the 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) thesis, reviewed in section 3.3, that the homogeneous 
societies that the US and Canada had facilitated the development of pro-growth 
institutions in these countries while in South America the presence of heterogeneous 
societies furthered the development of such institutions that constrained opportunities for 
the poor and hindered economic growth in consequence. The task then is to forge greater 
homogeneity in society, which is secured by forging convergence in beliefs amongst the 
individuals and the various sections of a society. 
The question is how to forge belief-convergence? Beliefs, being a function of 
learning and human environment, the answer lies in providing a uniform learning system 
and environment for the whole society. How to do that? The answer is: a uniform and 
universal education system for all during the formative years of human life i.e., childhood 
and adolescence. To design an institutional change then, the first and foremost 
requirement is to have a single system of education for all segments of the society, up to a 
certain minimum level, say till, Grade 12. By a single system, we mean that not only the 
curricula should be the same, but the environment in schools and colleges should also be 
more or less similar. Two students reading the same material and sharing the same  
environment are more likely to have the same beliefs as well. Individuals of a nation, 
who acquired the same education and have experienced similar environment at schools, 
are more likely to forge a homogeneous society—a pre-requisite for developing growth -
promoting institutions.  
Is Pakistan’s prevailing educational system capable of facilitating the development 
of a homogeneous society? To answer this question, we examine below the educational 
structure in Pakistan.  
At  the school/college level, Pakistan follows four different regimes that include: 
(i) the O/A level Cambridge system: the schools and colleges that use this system follow 
the curricula  prescribed by the authority which manages the O/A level system in UK, (ii) 
the English-medium private and public schools which follow the curricula prescribed by 
the government, (iii) the Urdu-medium government school system, that also follows the 
syllabi prescribed by the government, but the courses here are taught in the national 
language—Urdu, and (iv) the madressah system. The curricula of the madressah system 
are primarily focused on religious education and little effort is made to impart knowledge 
of secular subjects like science, mathematics and the arts. Besides, the medium of 
instruction is mostly the national language, Urdu. All the state-owned schools, that offer 
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education at a negligible fee primarily serve the poor and invariably use urdu as the 
medium of instruction. It is note worthy here that higher education (i.e beyond grade 12) 
is offered mostly in English language which is also the working language in offices, 
whether in public or private sector. 
. Thus the poor, having gone to Urdu medium, state-owned schools are at a 
disadvantage; their education makes them unfit for the job market. Government’s 
education policy-2009 acknowledges that white collar jobs seem to be reserved for the 
graduates  of English medium schools. This, coupled with the fact that the majority still 
goes to government Urdu medium schools, is bound to perpetuate inequality which in 
turn facilitates the development of institutions that ensure élite dominance and constrains 
economic opportunities for the poor. It is also obvious that the population which is the 
product of diverse educational systems, like that of Pakistan, is likely to develop beliefs 
that stand apart. The society will be heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous required for 
institutional change. To visualise how  heterogeneity may constrain institutional change, 
assume that all MPs in the national parliament are educated till say grade 14, with the 50 
percent of the MPs coming from the Cambridge (O/A level) system and the remaining 50 
percent from madressahs. Will the majority of MPs in this kind of educated parliament, 
share views on many issues?  It is no coincidence that a more or less similar education for 
all, up to a certain grade, by and large, is the norm in the developed world that boasts of 
good institutions. To make our case for common educational system stronger, we again 
lean on North (2005): 
 “The process of learning is unique to each individual but a common 
institutional/educational structure will result in shared beliefs and perceptions”. 
Our case for reform of the educational system also finds support in studies like 
Rajan (2006) and Azfar (2006). Rajan argues that strengthening the institutions like 
property rights etc. may help jump-start the economy for a while but the lack of 
endowments, like education, will leave the poor unprepared for reforms. He cautions that 
in this situation placement of pro-market institutions may fail to do the trick. Azfar 
(2006) argues that the shared belief system, which a universal educational system shall 
produce, will help bring about a consensus among the population, about the acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour of the rulers and will therefore force-in an honest 
government. 
The hardest to reform amongst the educational systems being practised in Pakistan 
is the madressah system. Madressahs are believed to inculcate the so-called orthodox 
beliefs in pupils, (the perception may or may not be true) and therefore attempts have 
been made, under foreign pressures, to reform the system. Such attempts have not borne  
fruit. The reason is that the objective has been to find a quick-fix solution. Unfortunately 
such a solution does not exist—the clergy that enjoys enough de facto power is not 
willing to yield. To address the issue one has to account for who goes to a madressah and 
why. Is the enrolment there by choice or is forced by circumstances. The madressahs in 
Pakistan, not only impart religious education, free of cost, but also offer food and shelter 
to the pupils. (The madressah system has been termed as the biggest NGO in Pakistan). 
The madressahs are apparently funded by charity money. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
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that mostly the wards of the poor are enrolled there. For the poorest of the poor, this is the 
easiest way to feed their children. In Pakistan, with around 30 percent of the population 
living below the poverty line, the enrolment on this count is not likely to be small. So the 
solution lies in addressing the overall issue of poverty, which in any case is not an easy 
one to tackle, before a number of institutions have been reformed. An alternate is to 
enforce compulsory enrolment in the formal school system, other than the madressahs. 
This again involves the cost of enforcement, compensating the parents for whom the non-
school going child is a bread-earner and of course tackling the opposition from the 
clergy.  
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to offer a solution but only to 
provide a glimpse of the hurdles involved, when one attempts to reform the educational 
system.  
The proposed common educational system also takes care of the next element in 
North’s theory: dominant beliefs matter. If all the subjects of a country have gone 
through the same kind of education and have faced more or less similar human 
environment, at least at schools and colleges, then belief-convergence between dominant 
and non-dominant players is likely. Still the beliefs of the dominant players would matter 
but given convergence, the preferences of the non-dominant players would be 
automatically, taken care of. 
North’s argument that comprehension of an issue of the dominant players 
determines the kind of institutions that will be developed to confront the issue, again 
provides room for the education to influence an institutional change, because it is the 
education, and of course the right kind of education, that would influence a person’s 
ability to correctly comprehend the issue at hand.  
That the dominant beliefs matter and that the intentionality of the dominant players 
matters as well  calls for choosing such people (through electoral process etc.) to hold de 
jure power, who share the beliefs of the society and who intend to allow the kind of 
institutions that the society prefers. The beliefs and intentions of the candidates aspiring 
for the de jure power can be tracked from a run down of the personal profile of the 
aspirants. For example, if the candidate or a political party is running for a second term, 
the performance in the previous term serves as a guide to judge the beliefs and 
intentionality of the players. However, for the constituents to correctly perceive the 
beliefs and intentions of the players, they must possess some education, whether formal 
or informal.   
But this is a  truth-judgment kind of a thing to say that to reform institutions to 
begin with, the educational system should be reformed. The issue is who would bell the 
cat? The natural candidate, in this context, is the de jure power. But the question is what 
motivates the de jure power to do this. The reform of the educational system, we expect, 
would reduce the voters’ ignorance and thereby lead to all-round institutional reform, 
including the change in the very structure of the de jure power or the change in the de 
jure power itself. Given the damage that the reform of the educational system can inflict 
upon the rulers, why would the de jure power shoot at its own foot? So, it is difficult to 
believe, if not naïve, that the de jure power will undertake the reform of the educational 
system on its own. 
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To reform, the pre-requisite implicit in Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) is that some de 
facto power must force the de jure power, to reform institutions. This begs the  question  
how such a de facto power will emerge. What incentive mechanism will facilitate the 
emergence of a de facto or de jure power, that may push for the reform of the educational 
system? This is a difficult question to answer; the popular print and electronic media may 
create awareness about the need for a common educational system. But the question then 
is; what motivates the media to do this?  
We have groped in the dark, perhaps without success, to find out as to what, and 
who would trigger the reform of the educational system. However one thing is for sure. 
Reform of the educational system would meet lesser resistance as compared to reform of 
the other institutions. For example, an attempt to begin the process of institutional reform 
with the change in the structure of de jure power or the change in the de  jure power itself 
will, in all likelihood, be resisted tooth and nail, by those who currently wield de jure 
power. Moreover if the change in de jure power is likely to adversely influence interests 
of strong foreign powers, then securing a change would become all the more difficult. 
The support extended to the  kleptocratic regime of General Mobutu in Congo to thwart 
communism is just one example of how and why foreign powers may support a corrupt 
regime rather than encourage growth-conducive institutional change. The case of 
Pakistan is no different. To further their own strategic ends, the foreign powers, that 
matter, have comfortably co-existed with at least three military regimes, in Pakistan. 
Similarly an attempt to establish institutions that do not allow rent-seeking, again may not 
be successful if the de jure power itself is deriving rents. It is noteworthy that all the 
reforms referred to above will adversely influence the de jure power today. 
In contrast, given path dependence, the reform of the educational system will, at 
best, influence the de jure power a generation hence. Typically, politicians being myopic, 
with the vision extending only up to the next elections, are not likely to be as scary of the 
reforms in educational system than they would be of the change in de jure power today, 
or the reform of any other institution that adversely influences their fortunes in the near-
term.  
Therefore the educational system, with its all-encompassing influence, global 
emphasis and relatively lesser resistance from the de jure power stands as the best 
candidate to begin the process of institutional reforms. The reform of the system and the 
increase in literacy rate will in all likelihood lessen, if not altogether eliminate, voters’ 
ignorance and misperceptions while voting. This would raise the possibility of choosing 
the right kind of people to hold de jure power. Secondly given the voters’ improved 
ability to choose, they are more likely to choose the ones who share their belief system. 
Thirdly, the rulers, having passed through the same educational system as available to the 
subjects, are more likely to carry the same beliefs as held by the subjects. It is the shared 
belief system that will facilitate reform of the remaining institutions.  
To understand why educational reforms should enjoy primacy over other reforms, 
let us look at the case of United States—one of the countries that can boast of good 
institutions today. Perhaps United States had the highest literacy rate in the world at the 
beginning of 19th century. The common school movement that began in 1820 did such 
good that by the middle of 19th century nearly 40 percent of the school age population 
had been enrolled and nearly 90 percent of the white adults were literate [Engerman and 
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Sokoloff (2002)]. United States is perhaps one country where making of the constitution 
was debated by way of writing as many as 89 academic papers—now referred to as the 
‘Federalist Papers’. This was in 1870s. The relationship between literacy and institutional 
change, evident from  the constitution making process of United States, is too apparent to 
be missed out.  
A more recent evidence of the relations between literacy and reforms is furnished 
by Paul Collier in ‘Bottoms Billions’. Collier (2007) argues that “countries need a critical 
mass of educated people in order to work out and implement a reform strategy” and 
substantiates it with the case of China and Tanzania. The author suggests that China and 
Tanzania both failed under Mao Ze Dong and Julius Nyerere respectively but given the 
critical mass of educated people, China was able to rethink its development strategy 
while Tanzania was not fortunate enough to have that critical mass. 
We have determined that in a heterogeneous society, the élite-dominated de jure 
power will not facilitate the development of growth-promoting institutions. Despite some 
useful debate, we failed to conclude that how such a de facto power may emerge, that can 
force the de jure power to reform institutions. Given the inconclusive debate on the 
emergence of the requisite de facto power, the question arises, do we gain anything from 
the simple awareness that the educational system should be the first one to be reformed, if 
the society cannot force the de jure power to reform the system? The answer is, yes. 
Suppose that the discontent in a country has reached a point where for the rulers to 
remain in power they must agree to one or the other institutional change demanded by the 
society, otherwise they face the threat of a revolution. It is at this point that the society 
should have a clear idea as to what kind of institutional change to demand. If the de jure 
power is deriving rents from a host of avenues and the society demands an immediate end 
to rent-seeking then the probability of acceptance of the demand is rather low as this will 
affect the fortunes of the de jure power of today. But if the society demands that all 
children aged five should receive similar education, then the possibility exists that the 
ruler, being myopic and faced with discontent and threat of a revolution, even though 
weak, will yield. History stands witness that a couple of Pakistan’s rulers, faced with 
public discontent had, in their twilight days, made an attempt to strike a bargain with the 
populists if not the public. It is at this moment in time that society should be aware of 
what it should demand? The demand should be: introduce a uniform educational system, 
for all and sundry.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
We set ourselves the task of finding answers to two questions. One, is it possible 
to reform institutions by design and if yes which institution should be chosen to be the 
first one to be reformed. Given the path dependence exhibited by institutions, it is not 
possible to reform institutions with a big bang i.e. in one-go. This leaves us with the 
alternative of practising gradualism in reforming institutions—the alternative preferred 
by North, Acemoglu and Rodrik.  Once we decide to adopt the gradual approach, the 
immediate issue that comes to the forefront is what to reform first? Hence our second 
question, i.e., from where to begin? 
We excluded the possibility of commercial interests, fiscal constraints and a 
revolution forcing an institutional change in Pakistan. Commercial interests in Pakistan 
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have typically thrived on favours from the de jure power and are therefore unlikely to 
emerge as a de facto power against its patron. Theoretically, fiscal constraints may 
encourage the government to strike a bargain with the citizens i.e.,taxation revenue in 
return for good institutions. But in practice, the de jure power will enter into bargain only 
if funds from other sources are not available. Given the strategic interests of foreign 
powers, foreign aid will alleviate the fiscal constraint and the rulers-citizens bargain will 
fail to materialise. The country does not seem ready for a revolution either. The thought 
process that typically precedes revolutions seems to have barely begun. The alternative, 
that remains then is the gradualist approach preferred by North, Acemoglu and Rodrik.   
Based on North’s theory of institutional change we took the position that 
institutions can be reformed by conscious design. North holds that institutions are a 
function of the beliefs of the society and that beliefs among other things are a function of 
one’s learning and experiences. He also holds the view that it is the beliefs of those in a 
position to enact institutional change that matter. Thus it is possible to mould one’s 
beliefs by influencing what a person learns and what he experiences. Change in beliefs, 
would then induce an institutional change. The notion of the human mind, at the time of 
birth, being tabula rasa (erased board) put forward by the enlightenment philosopher, 
John Locke, also supports our stance that education can shape beliefs to suit one’s end. 
Therefore we concluded that institutions can be reformed by conscious design. 
The answer to our second, but the main question is that among the list of 
institutions that call for reform, the reform of educational system should top the agenda. 
Educational system as the top-most candidate for reform meets the three point criteria 
laid down in Section 1 of the paper. The current diverse educational systems serve to 
create and perpetuate inequality and population heterogeneity. We proposed the 
introduction of a common educational system, for all and sundry, up to a certain 
minimum level, say grade 12. The argument being that the introduction of a common 
educational system will reduce inequality and foster homogeneity in population, which in 
turn will facilitate development of growth-promoting institutions. In a relative sense, the 
resistance to reform of the educational system i.e. resistance to establishment of a 
common education system, up to grade 12, is likely to be lesser than a direct attack on 
rent-seeking of the de jure power. The former would affect those who wield de jure 
power, a generation-hence, while the latter will adversely influence them today. The 
politicians, being myopic, will opt for the former rather than the latter. 
The educational system, as the top-most candidate for reform, also lives up to 
the second and third element of our criteria of choosing the first institution to be 
reformed. The common educational system will bring about convergence between the 
beliefs of the masses and those in position to enact institutional change. With the 
rulers and the subjects sharing beliefs, bringing about a change in the remaining 
institutions shall be less difficult. Thus the introduction of a common educational 
system will not only have an all-encompassing influence but the impact will be long-
lasting as well. 
We learned that a de facto power must emerge to force the de jure power to reform 
but failed to conclude how the said de facto power will emerge. Given that we do not 
know as to who will bell the cat, does it pay to be aware that the educational system 
should be the flag bearer of all institutional reforms. The answer is; yes it pays.  
Occasions do arise, when even a powerful dictator stands weakened and can see the 
eminent threat to his rule. It is at times like these that if the society has a clear idea of 
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what kind of institutional change is necessary, it can make the ruler yield. The demand of 
the society at moments like these should be  for establishing  a common educational 
system, for all and sundry, up to grade 12.  
To conclude, we want to re-emphasise that we do not expect the reform of the 
educational system to be impediment-free. One reason why  we recommend educational 
system as the foremost candidate for institutional reform is that we expect such reforms 
to face relatively lesser resistance. While evaluating our recommendation, the relative 
nature of the word ‘lesser’ should not be lost sight of. 
We have identified ‘commercial interest’ and the ‘need to generate revenue’ as the 
inappropriate levers of institutional change in Pakistan. More such areas can be explored, 
e.g. social protection and greater federalism. We leave this for future works. 
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